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Britain’s Prevent programme, described as being an education and community 
engagement-based policy approach to terrorism prevention (DCLG, 2007a;HMG, 
2011), has been highly contentious domestically but also influential on policy 
programmes developed in other western states similarly facing a significant threat 
of domestic Islamist terrorism (Neumann, 2011). Shaped in reaction to the 
shocking 7/7 London bombings of July 2005, the importance of this preventative 
policy has seemed self-evident, given the regular flow of foiled plots and 
convictions in the following years. The murder of soldier Lee Rigby In May 2013 by 
two British Islamist extremists represented the first civilian deaths in Britain 
through Islamist terrorism since 7/7, yet was this  comparative ‘success’ in 
avoiding further such deaths through Islamist terror actions anything to do with 
the focus and content of the large-scale Prevent programme? The immediate 
response of the Coalition government to the Woolwich murder was that Prevent 
needed more investment and must do better (Travis, 2013). However, how can 
the effectiveness of this terrorism prevention, ‘hearts and minds’ educational 
programme be measured? How do we know whether Prevent has made the 
people of Britain any safer or, indeed, whether, it may have made them less safe? 
What actually have been the ambitions and consequences of Britain’s Prevent 
programme to date, and is Prevent a temporary phenomenon soon to end or a 
long-term policy response? In response, the chapter questions whether Prevent, 
as we have known it, needs to exist (O’Toole et al, 2012). 
This chapter examines Britain’s Prevent programme and its operationalization to 
explore these key questions. It argues that, whilst some positive results have 
inevitably come from such a large-scale programme, Prevent has been 
conceptually mis-guided and inherently flawed, so leading to counter-productive 
overlaps and contradictions with other key policy agendas, particularly 
‘Community Cohesion’, the post-2001 British policy approach to multiculturalism 
and ethnic integration (Denham, 2001). Here it is suggested that Prevent has both 
significantly securitised the national and local state’s relationships with British 
Muslim communities, so damaging the very ‘human intelligence’ (English, 2009) 
needed to counter a genuine threat of terrorism and ideologies that support it, 
and also essentialised and reified Muslim faith identity in direct contradiction to 
wider policy agendas recognising and even promoting more intersectional, 
nuanced and contingent forms of identity. These problematic features have been 
inherent to Prevent and although there have been significant ‘turning points’ in 
the life of Prevent, most notably the supposed watershed of the June 2011 
Prevent Review, it is argued here that any changes have been superficial and 
limited. On that basis, the Chapter argues that Prevent, in its form and scale at 
time of writing, must come to an end, with the progressive, stated Prevent 
ambitions of partnership and education-based anti-extremism work developed in 
very different and more effective ways. 
To develop this case, the chapter first provides a brief overview of Prevent’s 
origins and factual development. It then discusses the stated and apparent 
ambitions of Prevent and the real, largely negative, consequences that have 
flowed from the operationalization of those ambitions. It goes onto discuss the 
temporalities of Prevent, both the nature and meaning of key episodes in the 
short life of Prevent, and what this analysis suggests about the longevity of 
Prevent in a distinct and recognisable form. 
The development of Prevent 
The overtly critical analysis of Prevent’s consequences and impacts developed 
below needs to acknowledge the essentially reactive nature of Prevent’s 
development. Whilst Prevent was one of the key elements, one of the so-called 
‘Four Ps’, of the original British CONTEST counter-International Terrorism policy 
(Home Office, 2003), it was entirely undeveloped until the 7/7 bombings. Here, 
whilst aware of domestic Islamist extremists in Britain, MI5 had not expected 
domestic terror attacks (Hewitt, 2008), as the 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings were interpreted as having both involved foreigners who had come to 
the countries with the specific goal of carrying out terrorist actions (a wrong 
interpretation of the Madrid attacks ; Atran, 2010).This, coupled with a continuing 
post-Good Friday Agreement concern with Northern Ireland meant that the Police 
and Security Services had neither good intelligence of, or a developed prevention 
plan in relation to, Britain’s Muslim communities and minorities within them 
promoting extreme Islamist doctrines. From then on Britain was playing catch-up, 
as shown by key elements of Prevent. One example of this is the fact that the 
initial, ‘Pathfinder’ phase of Prevent funding that commenced in April 2007 was 
aimed at the 70 local authority areas in England and Wales with 5% or more of 
their population being Muslim, a clear indication of the lack of reliable intelligence 
around Islamist extremist activity and its ‘hotspots’ (DCLG, 2007a; Thomas, 2012). 
In the later 2008-2011 iteration that saw a very significant expansion of Prevent, 
this was extended to all English local authorities with 2% or more of Muslims (a 
clumsy conflation of mainly Pakistani/Bangladeshi ethnic origins with faith 
identity; Thomas and Sanderson, 2011), but this still didn’t cover Crawley in 
Sussex, home of Omar Khyam, the key ringleader of the ‘Crevice’ bomb plot. 
This 2008 onwards expansion of Prevent demonstrated the complexity of the 
programme. Local Authority activity on Prevent was funded by the Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and saw very significant 
programmes of largely generalised and rather bland youth and community 
activity with groups of Muslim young people – the Government boasted of 
working with over 40,000 young Muslims in the first year alone (DCLG, 2008). 
Local Authorities were initially given very significant latitude over how to use this 
Prevent funding, with some using it to develop programmes in-house and others 
dispersing some or all the funding to local Muslim community groups (Lowndes 
and Thorp, 2010). A significant focus for many local authorities and partners was 
developments and improvements in local Muslim civil society organisations 
(Thomas, 2008), through initiatives such as committee training for Mosques and 
strengthening of educational processes at Madrassas (after-school Mosque 
classes for young people). Local Authorities were obliged to rapidly established 
local multi-agency co-ordination groups, known as Gold, Silver and Bronze groups 
to denote the seniority of the staff involved at each level, with these groups 
developing the local ‘Channel’ processes that were designed to work with 
individuals seen as in danger of ‘radicalisation’. Local Authorities also had to 
report to Government on their Prevent work via ‘National Indicator 35’, the 
Prevent-specific monitoring channel within national government’s overall funding 
and performance monitoring regime. All local authorities were obliged to 
establish and operationalize all of these Prevent developments and community-
focussed activity at very short notice, no matter what concerns or objections they 
had, as explored further below (Monro et al, 2010; Husband and Alam, 2011). 
Alongside this was funding from the Home Office via the newly-established Office 
for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) for Prevent programmes in Prisons, the 
Youth Offending Sector and Further and Higher Educational Institutions. Whilst 
the work with young offenders and adult prisoners involved direct educational 
programmes, Prevent activity directed at Universities and Colleges did not contain 
any direct educational work. Instead, it was concerned with strengthening 
relationships between the educational institutions and local Police and Counter-
Terrorism Units (CTUs), and of heightening scrutiny of student activity on and 
around campuses. At a national level, Home Office Prevent funding was utilised to 
develop more polyphonic Muslim representation with the establishment of 
Muslim Women’s and Young People’s Advisory Groups, and more ‘moderate’ 
forms of religious interpretation and leadership through bodies like the Sufi 
Muslim Council, the Quilliam Foundation and the Radical Middle Way road show 
series. 
Central to this Prevent activity across all sectors was the Police, with over 300 
new Prevent-dedicated Police posts established during 2008-2011. These were 
split between local-level ‘Prevent Engagement Officers’ and posts within the new 
regional CTUs that brought together the former Special Branch apparatus and the 
significantly expanded Security Service personnel. At the time of writing, the 
national investment in Prevent, a purely preventative, ‘hearts and minds’ 
education and engagement programme, had reached over £200 million since its 
inception in 2006. The sheer scale of this programme, coupled with the very 
significant role for Police and Security Service personnel, which includes pivotal 
positions in the local multi-agency arrangements (Lamb, 2012), inevitably 
attracted controversy. By 2009, evidence started to emerge of an apparent 
blurring of boundaries between education and surveillance (Kundnani, 2009; 
Dodd, 2009), with this including pressure on community and youth workers to 
provide intelligence to the Police, and even CTU staff getting involved in direct 
community-based Prevent delivery (Knight, 2010). Media coverage of these issues 
prompted an Inquiry by the Communities and Local Government Select 
Committee that focussed on the relationship between DCLG and the Home Office 
and the associated tensions between the Prevent and Community Cohesion policy 
agendas. The resulting report, published just before the May 2010 general 
election (House of Commons, 2010), was highly critical of Prevent’s organisation 
and called for DCLG to solely focus on Community Cohesion. 
The incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government immediately 
suspended further Prevent funding to local authorities and instituted a review of 
Prevent. After a long pause, apparently due to disagreements within the Coalition 
over Prevent’s emphasis, the 2011 Prevent Review (HMG, 2011) seemed to 
accept much of the CLG Select Committee’s recommendations in that DCLG was 
removed from Prevent involvement. Alongside this, the number of local 
authorities funded for Prevent activity was reduced to 28, supposedly on an 
intelligence-led basis (although this list was very similar to the 28 local authorities 
having the largest Muslim populations; O’Toole et at, 2012), with much closer 
scrutiny by OSCT and withdrawal of funding from Muslim community 
organisations seen as counter to western liberal norms, a stress on values in 
keeping with the policy direction identified in an earlier speech by Primer Minster 
Cameron (2011). These 2011 changes were  apparently accepted by the Labour 
opposition and generally seen as having successfully removed Prevent from the 
political foreground until the May 2013 Woolwich murder of soldier Lee Rigby 
raised fresh concerns about both Prevent’s effectiveness and the approach taken 
from 2011 onwards by the Coalition (Boffey and Doward, 2013). 
Prevent’s Ambitions 
A number of explicit and implicit ambitions can be identified for the Prevent 
programme. Some of these can be seen as constructive and thoughtful in theory, 
but problematic in terms of how they could be effectively implemented, 
monitored and evaluated – to be blunt, what is a programme like Prevent meant 
to achieve, and what would ‘success’ or effectiveness look like? Some ambitions 
of Prevent can be seen as somewhat in tension with each other, particularly 
between local Muslim community ‘responsibility’ (McGhee, 2010) and the 
securitised state’s desire for control over and knowledge of activities within those 
communities (Kundnani, 2009). Other ambitions of Prevent may have appeared 
logical in their own terms but blatantly in contradiction to wider and deeper state 
policy priorities, particularly those around ‘Community Cohesion’, 
multiculturalism and the re-evaluated conceptions of identity and citizenship 
underpinning them. Those blatant contradictions and their very significant and 
negative resulting impacts are discussed in the ‘Consequences’ section below. 
Credit has to be given to the British government for investing significantly in a 
terrorism prevention programme from 2006 onwards, given the traditional 
political and media pressure to focus exclusively on repressive interrogation of 
the broader (Muslim) communities seen as harbouring and even producing 
terrorists responsible for events such as 7/7 (Gupta, 2008). The counter-
productive effects of such clumsy crackdowns have been seen previously both 
historically in Northern Ireland, and within modern British Muslim communities 
(Hewitt, 2008). Arguably the new Prevent programme also gave the British state 
the opportunity to develop the more complex and developed channels of 
dialogue with Muslim communities that they wanted anyway (O’Toole et al, 
2013). 
However, the policy contradictions and lack of clarity about what Prevent was 
actually trying to achieve and who it was actually aimed at were apparent from 
the start. The context for this new Prevent initiative was a speech in January 2007 
by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, head of Counter-Terrorism 
Command at the Metropolitan Police, that Britain was losing the battle for ‘hearts 
and minds’ within Muslim communities, and the perception within the Security 
Services that there was a wider group of people within Muslim communities who 
held very negative feelings about the British state and some of its key policies, so 
providing a pool for terrorists to swim in (Thomas, 2012). What was not clear 
here, however, was how big the state viewed this ‘pool’ as being. In much of the 
earlier Prevent policy documentation (DCLG, 2007 a and b), there was talk of a 
small minority of extremists and of the state working in partnership with 
mainstream Muslims, as highlighted in then-DCLG Minister Ruth Kelly’s speech to 
launch the ‘pathfinder’ phase of Prevent: ‘Violent extremism seeks to drive us 
apart. Together, we will overcome it.’(DCLG, 2007b:2). However, the 
accompanying guidance documentation for local authorities charged with 
launching Prevent spoke of the need for ‘demonstrable changes in attitudes 
amongst Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007b:7). The sheer scale of the number of young 
Muslims engaged with by Prevent in that ‘Pathfinder phase’ (DCLG, 2008) and the 
subsequent 2008-11 expansion suggested both that the state perceived the ‘pool’ 
of potential terrorism supporters within Muslim communities to be really quite 
large and that the state had a very limited sense of who those people might be. 
 
State partnership and dialogue with Muslim communities around counter-
terrorism was certainly an aim of Prevent, and can be identified in a number of 
ways in the 2007-11 phase of the programme. The involvement of the DCLG in 
Prevent ensured that its national and local implementation was initially 
connected to broader engagement around cohesion, community regeneration 
and dialogue with faith communities. The initial latitude allowed local authorities 
to use Prevent money as they wanted, enabling some to hand over all or some of 
the money directly to Muslim community groups, and others to work 
collaboratively with them over the design of Prevent activity (Turley, 
2009;Lowndes and Thorp, 2010;Iacopini et al, 2011). This did meet with a mixed 
response. Many local authorities were reluctant to develop a distinct Prevent 
programme, both because it clashed with the aims and practice of the Community 
Cohesion policy agenda, as discussed below, and because the sheer scale of 
Prevent seemed to target and inherently stigmatise entire Muslim communities 
(Husband and Alam, 2011). Forced to implement the programme anyway, many 
local authorities used opaque titles like ‘Pathfinder’ to avoid the Prevent label 
(Thomas, 2008), whilst a significant number of Muslim community groups refused 
to accept Prevent funding, based on the same concerns of blanket stigmatisation. 
 
Nevertheless, there is significant empirical evidence that Prevent funding in this 
phase strengthened dialogue and understanding between Muslim communities 
and their local authorities and Police forces, and also enabled a strengthening in 
Muslim civil society structures and organisations (Turley, 2009; O’Toole et al, 
2013). On a national level considerable resources were provided for enhanced 
consultation structures with British Muslims and some success was achieved in 
developing more polyphonic community representation to government, albeit 
under an overtly counter-terrorism programme. This state approach has been 
characterised as: forcing responsibility for countering extremism onto Muslim 
communities through a process of devolving responsibility downwards’ (McGhee, 
2010:33) but can also be seen as a genuine attempt to develop partnership with 
‘responsible’ Muslims, one consistent with the communitarianist, third-way 
approach of a Labour government that was pessimistic about its ability to solely 
produce social change (Levitas, 2005). Whether ‘responsible’ Muslims are the 
same thing as religiously or politically ‘moderate’ Muslims has been an inherent 
tension within Prevent and the 2011 Prevent Review seemed to represent a 
decisive step towards the state demanding ‘moderation’ from any potential 
partners, so arguably undermining the effectiveness of Prevent against stated 
goals. 
 
What is clear from the above discussion is that Prevent has only been concerned 
with British Muslims, and has failed to develop any work around right-wing/racist 
terrorism, or other forms of political extremism (Thomas, 2012). This approach 
has been based on the state’s position that Islamist extremism is not only the 
most serious terrorism threat facing Britain, but is only the only one that is 
‘international’ in scope, so falling under the ‘CONTEST’ banner. The international 
links exposed by the far-right 2011 massacre in Norway and the developing ,trans-
national far-right ideologies supporting Breivik’s murders have not altered the 
view of the British state. This has left Britain’s Prevent programme as focussed 
only, and on a very large scale, on Muslim communities. This has been greatly 
problematic in terms of the resulting reactions from both the Muslim 
communities targeted and the other ethnic/faith communities not covered by this 
very substantial state funding scheme, as discussed below. It also indicates that 
the state understands the IsIamist terror threat purely in terms of Islamic identity 
and practice, despite the fact that there is no agreed profile of who is radicalised 
towards political violence and that the concept of ‘radicalisation’ itself is 
increasingly disputed (Kundnani, 2012). Here, it can be argued that, whilst this 
terrorist violence is planned and justified in the name of Islam, religion explains its 
motivations much less well than understandings of the rupturing experiences of 
trans-nationalism and globalisation, or even understandings of nihilistic and far-
left political violence (Roy, 2004). 
 
These problematic features inevitably lead onto questions of what Prevent is 
actually trying to achieve.  The ‘hearts and minds’ formulation of Prevent, and its 
strong focus throughout on young people identifies it as an educational 
programme. However, analysis of the 2007-11 phases suggested that very little 
educational input or dialogue around terrorism, political violence or forms of 
extremism was actually going on within Prevent programmes (Thomas, 2009, 
2010). This is not surprising for a number of reasons. Firstly, any such educational 
work would involve overt discussion of difficult and contentious issues, such as 
foreign wars, racism, suicide bombing and religion, and it is far from clear that 
such genuine political education/dialogue with young people is what the state 
had in mind when establishing Prevent. Evidence shows previous policy attempts 
to operationalize overt ‘anti-racist’ educational programmes with White young 
people in schools and youth projects were undermined by avoidance and lack of 
confidence within the professional practitioners involved, who felt that they 
lacked the materials, clarity and organisational support to do such work (Thomas, 
2011). Despite Prevent’s scale, little focus has been put on educational resources 
or, more crucially, on training and orientation for professional practitioners. The 
UK Youth Parliament, one of the small minority of Prevent-funded organisations 
who did engage in such overt and constructive political education work with 
young people (of all ethnic and faith backgrounds, on a community cohesion 
basis) offered to develop a national Prevent training programme for youth and 
community professionals, but the British government refused to fund it (House of 
Commons, 2010). Here, the evidence up until 2011 is of engagement with Muslim 
young people, but only very limited educational focus on the actual political, 
social and religious issues potentially driving any support for violent extremism 
(Thomas, 2012). The more limited and possibly more focussed Prevent 
programmes in funded areas post-2011 may have developed more robust 
educational content (although we have no evidence for this, as far as I’m aware), 
but they have remained Muslim-only, raising fundamental questions about how 
mind-sets relating to ‘other’ communities and intolerant social norms in the wider 
community can be influenced without having meaningful contact with those 
‘other’ lifestyles, beliefs and value systems. 
 
Certainly, Prevent, at least in its 2007-11 phase, involved overt attempts at social 
engineering over community leadership and social and religious practices within 
British Muslim communities. This can be seen in the national prioritisation of new 
consultation bodies representing Muslim women and young people, and the 
requirement that local authorities also prioritise such work locally. There was also 
the breaking off of contact with the Mosque based Muslim Council of Britain, and 
the establishment of and support for ‘moderate’ bodies like the Sufi Muslim 
Council and anti-extremist think-tank the Quilliam Foundation (Birt, 2009). More 
specifically, there was considerable focus on religious interpretation, and on the 
organisation and conduct of religious organisations and places of worship. These 
included the ‘Radical Middle Way’ road shows aimed at promoting ‘moderate’ 
interpretations of Islam and its place in western societies to young Muslims, and 
considerable focus on the organisation and content of Madrassas and of the 
training and linguistic skills of new Imams recruited by Mosques. 
 
Other fundamental features of Prevent would suggest that it is actually a 
securitised engagement approach with Muslim communities, much more about 
intelligence-gathering , facilitation/encouragement of self-policing and possibly 
even surveillance, rather than ‘education’ in any meaningful sense (Kundnani, 
2009; Husband and Alam, 2011). Certainly the very large number of new and 
dedicated Police/Security Service posts focussed on Prevent and the pivotal role 
of the Police and OSCT/regional CTUs in the programme’s local and national co-
ordination would support this perspective. The specific and evidenced examples 
of surveillance and of Police/CTU pressure on educational practitioners to pass on 
intelligence provided in the ‘Spooked’ (Kundnani, 2009) report were flatly 
contradicted by the then Labour government. However, more recent research on 
the role played by the West Midlands CTU in Prevent clearly identifies the Police 
as the main players in Prevent (Lamb, 2012).  
 
Not only have the Police led and dominated decisions over Prevent funding and 
planning, they have even got involved in direct ‘educational’ delivery with Muslim 
young people and communities, a highly questionable blurring of professional 
boundaries (Knight, 2010). Following the 2011 Prevent Review, local autonomy 
over Prevent largely disappeared, with even the funded areas having to apply 
regularly to the Police and Security Service officers-led OSCT for funding against 
specific criteria. Anecdotal evidence suggests refusal of support for any bids 
involving non-Muslims or research, and personal Ministerial scrutiny of bids, even 
though the eventual delivery is largely by local authority or third sector youth and 
community workers. The large-scale, monocultural focus on British Muslim 
communities and the centrality of the Police and Security Services to all levels and 
aspects of Prevent make it very hard to avoid the conclusion that it is significantly 
an intelligence-gathering and surveillance system, operationalized overtly at least 
partially through ‘engagement’. Indeed, Prevent’s creator, Sir David Omand, 
doubted that engagement and intelligence-gathering could or even should be 
separated within practice (APPGHS, 2011) This can be seen most clearly around 
the Higher and Further Education sector, where Prevent activity has been entirely 
about Police/CTU liaison with educational institutions and state focus on how 
those institutions monitor Muslim student activity on and around campuses, 
rather than any educational engagement with students themselves (Thomas, 
2012). 
 
The problematic stated and implicit ambitions of Prevent discussed above mean 
that it has been very hard for politicians to explain, or for the general public to 
understand, what Prevent is actually for. Indeed, when John Denham took over as 
DCLG Minister he identified that: I found in the CLG, after some very rigorous 
examinations with officials that there was no understood model of how Prevent 
was meant to work. 
(O’Toole et al, 2013:57) 
This, and the concurrent political scrutiny over the real purpose and content of 
Prevent (House of Commons, 2010), led Denham, a Minister with strong 
educational and community cohesion credentials (Denham, 2001), to offer the 
clarification to the national Prevent conference held in late 2009 that Prevent was 
a ‘crime prevention programme’ (Denham, 2009). This was a potentially helpful 
attempt to answer allegations that Prevent had much wider and more 
questionable ambitions around surveillance or around altering the leadership and 
practices of British Muslim communities. However, it was also highly problematic. 
Firstly, assuming the ‘crime’ to be prevented was terrorism, why has Prevent 
engaged with such large numbers of Muslim young people, yet focussed so little 
on political , social and individual/psychological factors likely to make at least 
some young Muslims be at risk of terrorist involvement, as discussed above? 
Secondly, British crime prevention-based  youth activities, such as Youth Inclusion 
Projects managed by local Youth Offending Teams, work with smaller numbers of 
carefully-targeted young people, often referred by relevant agencies. The 
‘Channel’ programme, one small element of Prevent nationally, would seem to fit 
the ‘crime prevention’ understanding reasonably well, but the broader, large-
scale Prevent activity to date outlined above simply doesn’t fit any meaningful 
understanding of that concept. It is highly likely that this stated ambition and 
formulation was offered by a minister, and a whole government department, 
deeply unconvinced by Prevent and the role within it that they were being asked 
to play. 
The Consequences of Prevent 
The shape and content of Prevent outlined above, alongside the explicit and 
implicit ambitions analysed, have led to some clear, and largely negative, 
consequences flowing from this (over) ambitious counter-terrorism programme. 
In particular, three key consequences of Prevent can be identified. Firstly, there is 
the very significant contradiction to the broader policy agenda of Community 
Cohesion and ethnic integration and the damaging overlap with it in terms of 
‘space’ for policy development and implementation. It is argued here and 
elsewhere (Thomas, 2012) that these contradictions and tensions between the 
two policy agendas have gravely damaged the development of community 
cohesion practice whilst also undermining the effectiveness of Prevent itself. 
Secondly, the monocultural and large-scale focus on essentialised Muslims and 
their reified faith identity by the British state through Prevent has hardened 
defensive and antagonistic identifications within Muslim communities whilst also 
promoting ‘virulent envy’ (Birt, 2009) over resource allocation from other ethnic, 
faith and social class communities. Lastly, it has clearly securitised the British 
state’s relationships with Muslim communities at both national and local levels 
(Kundnani, 2009), something that has grown significantly under the Coalition 
government and their 2011 Prevent Review. This has given at least the 
appearance of large-scale surveillance and has inevitably damaged the flow of 
much-needed human intelligence. 
The Prevent/Community Cohesion tension 
The relationship between Prevent and the pre-existing policy priority of 
community cohesion has been problematic from the start. The problem here is 
not just an organisational one of demarcation but a much more fundamental, 
conceptual one relating to Prevent’s failure to reflect and work with the analysis 
and approach of community cohesion, so damaging the effectiveness of Prevent 
on its own stated terms. The British discursive policy shift from multiculturalism 
to community cohesion came in the wake of the 2001 northern riots involving 
young Muslims, but was a direction government wanted to go in anyway 
(Thomas, 2011). Its foregrounding of commonality and shared values, rather than 
discrete and separate ethnic and faith identifications reflects a growing concern 
that ‘parallel lives’ were developing for such separate communities, not just in 
terms of physical segregation but in terms of lack of shared contact, cultures and 
identifications (Cantle, 2001). Here, there was not only a focus on individual and 
community agency consistent with wider Labour social policy analysis and 
prescriptions, but also the perception that the previous phase of ‘political 
multiculturalism’ state policy had increasing downsides. These previous policies 
had of necessity deployed ‘strategic essentialism’ (Law, 1996) to tackle the gross 
ethnic inequalities and blatant racial discrimination common to Britain of the 
1980s and greatly contributed to the significant diminution of those ethnic 
inequalities and overt racism. However, in their focus on distinct ethnic identifies, 
such policies both hardened and reified these distinct ethnic/faith identities 
whilst providing separate, defined spaces for these individual communities. The 
post-2001 riots analysis, highly relevant to the ambitions of Prevent, was that  
extreme and oppositional identities and ideologies can develop more easily in 
culturally segregated communities holding antagonistic attitudes to ‘others’, an 
analysis as true of White racism as of extreme strands within Muslim 
communities. 
This analysis from the post-riots Cantle Report (2001) was accepted by 
government and adopted as a new policy priority (Denham, 2001). The resulting 
national government guidance and funding streams for local authorities focussed 
very much on cross-community contact and work programmes that emphasised 
common needs and interests. This emphasis on commonality, alongside some 
sections of the report and some associated political pronouncements that 
seemed to focus very partially on Muslim responsibility (Travis, 2001), was 
interpreted by some as a lurch back to the coercive assimilationist approach of 
the 1960s, a denial of difference and of multiculturalist progress itself (Kundnani, 
2002; Alexander, 2004). However, empirical evidence on how community 
cohesion has been interpreted and implemented on the ground contradicts this 
(Thomas, 2011). Here, community cohesion practice involves acknowledgment 
and celebration of distinct ethnic and faith identities but also work that 
emphasises cross-community content and commonality, so seeking to augment 
distinct identities with stronger forms of shared identity. Such cross-community 
contact is based upon ‘contact-theory’ (Hewstone et al, 2007), a social 
psychology-based approach to prejudice reduction carried out in depth and over 
considerable time. Such community cohesion-based approaches have strong 
support from local policy-makers and practitioners (Monro et al, 2010), meaning 
that when Prevent was announced local authorities in key areas like West 
Yorkshire fully understood the domestic terrorist threat but didn’t see why a 
separate policy programme was needed – for them, the community cohesion 
programmes they were enthusiastically developing were exactly designed to 
address and counter prejudices and extremism of all kinds (Husband and Alam, 
2011). 
Moreover, Prevent’s monocultural focus on Muslims, interested only in their 
‘Muslimness,’ was understood as directly counter to the policy approach to 
identity in society inherent to community cohesion. Here more intersectional 
understandings of individual citizenship based around a human rights framework 
were being developed in tandem, with the need for more ‘cooler’ and contingent 
identifications seen as vital in an increasingly diverse and complex society 
(McGhee, 2006). The scale and width of Prevent’s monocultural focus on Muslims 
as an undifferentiated community remains a flagrant contradiction to the 
community cohesion policy agenda and is viewed as highly problematic by the 
ground level policy-makers and practitioners asked to implement it (Husband and 
Alam, 2011). 
Beyond this conceptual contradiction were practical and organisational problems 
for community cohesion flowing from Prevent’s rapid and nationally-forced 
implementation. The demands for local authorities to quickly develop Prevent 
programmes and the associated multi-agency liaison structures meant that focus 
on developing community cohesion programmes and structures waned (Monro et 
al, 2010) and its forward progress stalled – terrorism was simply seen as more 
urgent and important than community relations, emphasised by the ubiquitous 
presence of counter-terrorism police and Security Service staff. The relationship 
between the two policy agendas was identified as problematic by a range of 
submissions to the CLG Select Committee Inquiry into Prevent (House of 
Commons, 2010), and the eventual Prevent Review of 2011 seemed to accept the 
Inquiry’s recommendations to separate DCLG and the Home Office, Community 
Cohesion and Prevent. However, by then the damage had been done. The Muslim 
Participation in Contemporary Governance project identifies a senior civil servant 
at the OSCT as acknowledging that, because of the sheer power of OSCT, ‘so what 
happened was Prevent took over Cohesion’ (O’Toole at al ,2013:57), a national 
process that was replicated at local ground level. This was confirmed in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Prevent Review, as OSCT control of local Prevent activity 
became total, whilst the government’s long-awaited ‘Integration’ (their new term 
for community cohesion) policy document (DCLG, 2012) was a grievous 
disappointment. It washed national government’s hands of community 
cohesion/integration, saying that it was a matter for local government only. All 
national monitoring, guidance and finding for community cohesion was ended 
forthwith and the document didn’t use the terms ‘racism’ or ‘equalities’ at all. 
Meanwhile, Prevent, focused only on Muslims, sailed onwards. 
 
 
A Suspect Community? 
Prevent’s large-scale and monocultural focus on Muslim communities has not just 
been contradictory and damaging to community cohesion, but has done very real 
damage both to the state’s relationship with Muslim communities and 
relationships between distinct communities. The term ‘suspect community’, 
resonant of Britain’s previous attitude to those of Catholic Irish origin and living in 
Britain, has been deployed in relation to the state’s approach to British Muslims 
(Hickman et al, 2010), but this only partially works around Prevent’s impact. Some 
key figures and organisations within British Muslim communities have 
enthusiastically participated in Prevent (O’Toole et al, 2013), not just seeing it as 
helpful ‘Muslim money’ (Lowndes and Thorp, 2010), but also as a mechanism for 
acknowledging and confronting extremist activity and ideologies within their 
communities. However, the scale of the programme, and its securitised reality 
discussed below, has undoubtedly fuelled further defensive identifications and 
feelings amongst British Muslims who have suffered significant, hostile criticisms 
from both sections of the mainstream media and from overtly Islamophobic 
political groups like the English Defence League. Such pressure and constant 
questioning of their individual and collective ‘loyalty’ to Britain (Thomas and 
Sanderson, 2011) makes it easier, not harder for young Muslims to be attracted to 
the ‘single narrative’ of worldwide Muslim grievance and oppression propagated 
by extreme strands of political Islamism. The overt social engineering of Muslim 
representation by Prevent described above, the significant and worrying extent of 
the state’s ‘internal penetration’ of Muslim communities as Stuart Hall (BBC Radio 
4, 2011) has described it, merely adds to such feelings for some Muslims, 
exacerbated by Prevent’s failure to engage with other forms of extremism, 
particularly far-right racism and violence. Repeated political calls to ban non-
violent Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahir without also banning the EDL also add to 
such perceptions. 
Meanwhile Yaha Birt (2009) accurately predicted that the money and focus of 
Prevent would create ‘virulent envy’ amongst other ethnic, faith and social 
communities. The 2001 riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford were significantly 
provoked by the sense within some marginalised White communities that Muslim 
communities were favoured by government funding streams (Thomas and 
Sanderson, 2013). This was factually wrong but the ‘strategic essentialism’ (Law, 
1996) and ethnicised targets of political multiculturalism policies made such 
racialised interpretations more possible. Such resentment was illustrated in the 
CLG Select Committee Inquiry process, when representatives of all the other 
major faiths queued up to give evidence and complain that Muslims were getting 
state funding for mundane development of faith facilities such as madrassas 
whilst simultaneously claiming that only Muslims had an ‘extremism’ problem! 
(House of Commons, 2010). The large, mononcultural and unfocussed nature of 
Prevent between 2007 and 2011 made such grievances from other communities 
plausible at a time of significant cuts in other policy funding streams. 
Policed Multiculturalism? 
The allegations that Britain’s Prevent programme has been little more than an 
elaborate surveillance scheme devised by the ‘spooks’ have been aired and 
argued over elsewhere (Kundnani, 2009;House of Commons, 2010). The broader 
point is that such allegations are possible to make, and seem as significantly 
credible as elements of them do, because of the pivotal role for the Police and 
Security Service personnel in Prevent design and delivery, both locally via the 
Regional CTUs, and nationally via the controlling OSCT. It is inescapable that a 
policy programme apparently about education and community-based 
engagement has been controlled and sometimes directly delivered by these 
forces of overt state power – a clear securitisation of the state’s relationship with 
Muslim communities, given the scale and complexity of the Prevent programme.  
Earlier, the chapter discussed how the Prevent policy agenda has both 
contradicted and ultimately side-lined the community cohesion/integration 
agenda that actually offered valuable insights on both the causes of extremism 
and on how to develop an inclusive and non-stigmatising vehicle for addressing 
extremism and ideologies that support it. Within Prevent we have seen a growing 
securitisation and progressively increasing Police/CTU control over the 
programme, despite continual rhetoric of partnership and multi-agency dialogue 
(HMG, 2011). There is clear evidence that as the local and regional Prevent multi-
agency co-ordination processes developed, the Police became more powerful and 
used that power to progressively limit local autonomy, so ending the minority of 
creative attempts to implement Prevent. This is highlighted in an empirical study 
of the role played by West Midlands CTU and its officers in Prevent: 
The Police seem to have been given the responsibility of delivering Prevent 
because other local bodies did not process the organisational capability to 
successfully implement, manage and adapt a programme… despite Prevent being 
proposed as a multi-organisational programme, the Police in the West Midlands  
are the central organisation and undertake the majority of the work relating to 
Prevent. 
(Lamb, 2012:91)    
This growing Police/CTU hegemony can be explained partly by their resource 
dominance – the Police had a great number of dedicated, Prevent funded posts, 
whilst local authority Prevent funding was overwhelmingly for activities, rather 
than posts, with the burden of Prevent liaison therefore falling on hard-pressed 
policy officers who also had responsibility for wider policy agendas such as 
community cohesion. However, it can also be explained in terms of ‘cultural 
capital’, with the Police/CTU  having the monopoly on intelligence and knowledge 
about on-going plots and criminal investigation that could only be shared on a 
‘need to know basis’ (Husband and Alam, 2011), so establishing a clear cultural 
dominance and pecking order within Prevent operations. The Prevent Review 
(HMG, 2011) extended this dominance significantly at the national level, cutting 
out the more partnership-orientated DCLG and making Prevent the sole property 
of the criminal justice-focussed Home Office. As outlined above, this Review also 
gave the OSCT and its staff total control of all funding to and activities by local 
authorities. 
Other elements of Prevent support such an analysis of securitisation. The Prevent 
Review put renewed emphasis on ‘Channel’, mechanism by which individuals 
viewed as vulnerable to radicalisation and to even ‘grooming’ by violent 
extremists are identified and referred, through multi-agency processes, to 
individual counselling or appropriate group work programmes. Some of the 
approach of Channel answers earlier questions levelled at Prevent, in that it 
works with only small numbers – hundreds, not many thousands, and identifies 
those individuals on a stated basis of facts and evidence. Channel is also probably 
the best example of interventions by skilled and confident professional 
practitioners who feel equipped to engage with complex and sensitive issues 
attached to ‘radicalisation’. However, it involves identifying and intervening with 
young people, including a significant number aged 14 years old and under (HMG, 
2011), who have not committed any crime or participated in any identifiable 
criminal conspiracy. A briefing document prepared for the US Congress on 
international terrorism prevention approaches (Neumann, 2011) admitted that a 
Channel-type approach would be viewed as completely unacceptable in the US 
due to civil liberty concerns. Similarly, Prevent’s focus on Universities has been 
entirely about monitoring of student activity and behaviour on and around 
campuses, and liaison between CTU and educational institutions (Thomas, 2012). 
The Coalition government and influential think tanks have been fiercely critical of 
British universities for not doing enough to identify and counter violent 
extremism (House of Commons, 2012), yet what they propose seems to raise 
fundamental challenges to notions of academic freedom and the concept of 
Universities as institutions where difficult and important social, moral and 
political subjects can be both researched and debated openly and freely. The 
dangers of such a mind-set were demonstrated by the arrest and detention of 
two research students at the University of Nottingham on the grounds that they 
had downloaded Islamist extremist material that was both available in the 
University library and freely available on the Amazon website. Anti-Islamist think 
tanks such as the Henry Jackson Society /Centre for Social Cohesion have been 
significantly influential in fuelling this scrutiny of Universities, but the evidence 
base for actual terrorist recruitment or plots being developed on University 
campuses is very weak and unconvincing (House of Commons, 2012). 
 
Prevent: Coming to an end? 
Given the issues and tensions around Prevent that have been highlighted here, 
what is the prognosis for Prevent – is it a temporary phenomenon or a permanent 
reality? To date, Prevent’s development has been unpredictable and uncertain. It 
existed in name only until the visceral shock of the 7/7 bombings and the 
realisation that this was a domestic plot (Hewitt, 2008). Rapidly operationalized, 
often despite vehement opposition and concerns from local authorities and 
respected Muslim community organisations, Prevent was launched without a 
clear blueprint or developed sense of how its ambitions could be meaningfully 
operationalized. The chapter has highlighted the opposition and uncertainty 
about Prevent from local authorities and their parent government department, 
the DCLG. Here, even if Prevent was not deliberately intended as a Police-led 
surveillance scheme, the lack of a clear and achievable methodology and strategy, 
and the associated uncertainty of local government left the Police and Security 
Service in growing charge. 
The inevitable charges of spying (Dodd, 2009) could have sunk Prevent, but the 
continuing reality of foiled plots and convictions has made it very hard for 
politicians of all parties to step away from a programme that visibly demonstrates 
to the general public that something (even if it’s not the right thing) is being done 
to stop this threat in the long-term. The 2011 Prevent Review did succeed in 
cooling off political and media concern about Prevent by down-sizing it 
significantly and ending ‘means-based’ funding for radical Islamist groups working 
with vulnerable young people. Many local authorities ceased to receive Prevent 
funding after 2011 but were still required to have action plans and multi-agency 
liaison structures as part of their normal, on-going operations. This 
‘mainstreaming’ approach – Prevent without dedicated Prevent funding - may be 
the long-term direction of travel, and it will continue to be controlled by the 
Police/CTU, rather than by those local authorities involved more organic and 
nuanced contact with Muslim communities and their varied representatives. 
However, the immediate response to the May 2013 Woolwich murder focussed 
on whether Prevent was doing enough things or doing them in the right way 
(Travis, 2013;Boffey and Doward, 2013), and highlighted the continued political 
and popular pressure to have a named and visible terrorism prevention 
programme whilst Britain continues to have an apparent Islamist terror threat. 
This is a worrying conclusion, as this chapter has argued that the confused 
ambitions and the monocultural focus of Prevent alongside its contradictory 
tension with community cohesion have had strongly negative consequences. 
These have been to undermine and side-line community cohesion work, to 
further alienate and separate Muslim communities through a reification of 
simplistic and essentialised faith identity and to overtly securitise the state’s 
relationship with those Muslim communities on a very large scale. Rather than 
continue, in overt or ‘mainstreamed’ covert forms, Prevent needs to be ended. 
Any genuine attempts to create community-based anti-extremism programmes 
with young people need to draw on the analysis of, and work in harmony with,  
constructive and non-stigmatising community cohesion practice (Thomas, 2011) 
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